| |
mark :: blog :: metrics
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.2 was released this week (Dec 2011), just
over six months since the release of 6.1 in May 2011. So let's
use this opportunity to take a quick look back over the
vulnerabilities and security updates made in that time, specifically
for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Server.
Errata count
The chart below illustrates the total number of security updates issued for Red
Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Server if you had installed 6.1, up to and including the
6.2 release, broken down by severity. It's split into two columns, one for
the packages you'd get if you did a default install, and the other if you
installed every single package (which is unlikely as it would involve a bit of
manual effort to select every one). For a given installation, the number of
package updates and vulnerabilities that affected you will depend on exactly what you
have installed or removed.
So, for a default install, from release of 6.1 up to and including 6.2, we
shipped 36 advisories to address 121 vulnerabilities. 2 advisories were rated
critical, 10 were important, and the remaining 24 were moderate and low.
Or, for all packages, from release of 6.1 up to and including 6.2, we shipped
88 advisories to address 218 vulnerabilities. 10 advisories were rated critical,
16 were important, and the remaining 62 were moderate and low.
Critical vulnerabilities
The 10 critical advisories addressed 31 critical vulnerabilities across 3 components:
- Two updates to the OpenJDK 6 Java Runtime
(June 2011,
October 2011)
where a malicious web site presenting a Java applet could potentially run arbitrary code as the user
running a web browser.
- Four updates to Firefox (June
2011, August 2011,
September 2011,
November 2011)
where a malicious web site could potentially run arbitrary code as the user
running Firefox.
- Four updates to Thunderbird (June
2011,
August 2011,
September 2011
November 2011)
where a malicious email message could potentially run arbitrary code as the user
running Thunderbird.
Updates to correct all of the 31 critical vulnerabilities were
available via Red Hat Network either the same day or the next calendar
day after the issues were public.
Other significant vulnerabilities
Although not in the definition of critical severity, also of interest during
this period were a few flaws that were high risk or easily exploitable:
A flaw in Bind, CVE-2011-4313
fixed by RHSA-2011:1458
where a malicious client could cause Bind to stop responding, a denial
of service attack. This flaw was discovered by it being accidentally
triggered in the wild.
A flaw in the Apache HTTP Server, CVE-2011-3192,
fixed by RHSA-2011:1245, where a remote attacker could
cause a denial of service attack. This was discovered due to a public exploit.
A flaw in RPM, CVE-2011-3378
fixed by RHSA-2011:1349
where a specially-crafted RPM package that, when queried or installed,
would cause rpm to crash or, potentially, execute arbitrary code prior to any
signature checking. We're not aware of any working exploits for this issue.
Updates to blacklist the DigiNotar Certificate Authority.
Previous update releases
To compare these statistics with previous update releases we need to take into
account that the time between each update release is different. So looking at
a default installation and calculating the number of advisories per month
gives the following chart:
This data is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running Enterprise
Linux 6 Server, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other major
versions, distributions, or operating systems -- for example, a default install
of either Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4AS and 6 Server does not include Firefox, but a
default install of 5 Server does. You can use
our public security
measurement data and tools, and run your own custom metrics for any given
Red Hat product, package set, timescales, and severity range of interest.
We pushed an
update to Flash Player for Red Hat Enterprise Linux Supplementary today, on
a Friday, because it fixed Critical vulnerabilities. But we try not to push
updates on a Friday unless they are critical and already public.
So let's take a look at the most common times and days we push
advisories for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, and 6 (including
Supplementary) using a heatmap:
The more advisories pushed for a given date and hour, the darker
that section of the graph is. So the most popular times
for pushing advisories are Tuesdays at 10am and 2pm Eastern US time,
Fridays are pretty light for pushes, and there was nothing
during the weekends. The spread of the graph shows that we push advisories when
they are ready, rather than waiting to a fixed day and time, in order to reduce
the risk to users.
All the data used to create this graph is available as part of
our public metrics.
Thanks to Sami Kerola for
the R code from which I based my
graph generation.
Every year since Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 was released we've
published a risk report where we look at the state of security
of the distribution. We investigate the key vulnerabilities,
metrics on vulnerability counts, and how users could have been
exploited by them. The
Six
Years
of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 report (PDF) covering Feb 2005-2011
was published today.
"Red Hat knew about 51.5% of the security vulnerabilities
that we fixed in advance. The
average time between Red Hat knowing about an issue and it being made
public was 23 days (median 10 days).... A default installation of Red
Hat Enterprise Linux 4 AS was vulnerable to 20 critical security
issues over the first six years. "
The data we publish is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running
Enterprise Linux, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other
distributions, or operating systems. One important difference is that it is Red
Hat policy to count vulnerabilities and allocate CVE names to all issues that
we fix, including ones that are found internally. This is not true for many
other vendors including folks like
Microsoft
and
Adobe
who do not count or disclose issues they fix which were found internally.
A few weeks ago the 2011 update to
the CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous
Software Errors was published. As part of our contribution to this
update we analysed the most severe vulnerabilities that affected Red Hat
since the last update and mapped each one to the appropriate Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) type.
The table below lists all vulnerabilities which have a CVSS score of 7
or more ('high'), that we fixed in any product during calendar year 2010.
Most common CWE were: - Buffer Copy without Checking
Size of Input
(CWE-120): 8 vulnerabilities.
-
Race Condition
(CWE-362): 5 vulnerabilities.
| CVE | CWE | 2011 top 25? | CVSS base score | Fixed in |
|
CVE-2007-4567
| CWE-476 | no
| 7.8
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-0778
| CWE-770 | no
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-1385
| CWE-191 | no
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-3080
| CWE-129 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-3245
| CWE-252 | no
| 7.6
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (openssl)
|
|
CVE-2009-3726
| CWE-476 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-4005
| CWE-127 | no
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-4027
| CWE-362 | no
| 7.8
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-4141
| CWE-416 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-4212
| CWE-191 | no
| 10.0
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (krb5)
|
|
CVE-2009-4272
| CWE-764 | no
| 7.8
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-4273
| CWE-78 | yes
| 7.9
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (systemtap)
|
|
CVE-2009-4537
| CWE-120 | yes
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2009-4895
| CWE-362 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-0008
| CWE-606 | no
| 7.8
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-0291
| CWE-822 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-0738
| CWE-424 | no
| 7.5
| JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 4.2, 4.3
|
|
CVE-2010-0741
| CWE-20 | no
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kvm)
|
|
CVE-2010-1084
| CWE-120 | yes
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-1086
| CWE-20 | no
| 7.8
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-1087
| CWE-362 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-1166
| CWE-823 | no
| 7.6
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (xorg-x11-server)
|
|
CVE-2010-1173
| CWE-120 * | yes
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-1188
| CWE-416 | no
| 7.8
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-1436
| CWE-120 | yes
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-1437
| CWE-362 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-2063
| CWE-823 | no
| 7.5
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5 (samba)
|
|
CVE-2010-2235
| CWE-77 | no
| 7.1
| Red Hat Network Satellite Server 5.3 (cobbler)
|
|
CVE-2010-2240
| CWE-788 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-2248
| CWE-682 | no
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-2492
| CWE-805 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-2521
| CWE-805 | no
| 8.3
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-2798
| CWE-476 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-2962
| CWE-823 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-3069
| CWE-129 | no
| 8.3
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, 6 (samba)
|
|
CVE-2010-3081
| CWE-131 | yes
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, 4, 5, 6, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-3084
| CWE-120 | yes
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-3301
| CWE-129 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-3302
| CWE-120 | yes
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan)
|
|
CVE-2010-3308
| CWE-120 | yes
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan)
|
|
CVE-2010-3432
| CWE-805 * | no
| 7.8
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, 6, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-3705
| CWE-788 | no
| 8.3
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, MRG (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-3708
| CWE-77 | no
| 7.5
| JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 4.3, SOA Platform 4.2
|
|
CVE-2010-3752
| CWE-78 | yes
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan)
|
|
CVE-2010-3753
| CWE-78 | yes
| 7.1
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openswan)
|
|
CVE-2010-3847
| CWE-426 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (glibc)
|
|
CVE-2010-3856
| CWE-426 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (glibc)
|
|
CVE-2010-3864
| CWE-362 | no
| 7.6
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 (openssl)
|
|
CVE-2010-3904
| CWE-822 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5, 6 (kernel)
|
|
CVE-2010-4170
| CWE-88 | no
| 7.2
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5, 6 (systemtap)
|
|
CVE-2010-4179
| CWE-862 | yes
| 7.5
| Red Hat Enterprise MRG (cumin)
|
|
CVE-2010-4344
| CWE-120 | yes
| 7.5
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 5 (exim)
|
* - in both these cases the outcome is not a buffer overflow as the possible
overflow is detected and instead converted into an abort (DoS)
See also our 2010 analysis
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.7 was released last week (July 2011), six months
since the release of 5.6 in January 2011. So let's use this opportunity to take
a quick look back over the vulnerabilities and security updates made in that
time, specifically for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Server.
Errata count
The chart below illustrates the total number of security updates issued for Red
Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Server if you had installed 5.6, up to and including the
5.7 release, broken down by severity. It's split into two columns, one for
the packages you'd get if you did a default install, and the other if you
installed every single package (which is unlikely as it would involve quite a bit of
manual effort to select every one). For a given installation, the number of
package updates and vulnerabilities that affected you will depend on exactly
what packages you have installed or removed.

So, for a default install, from release of 5.6 up to and including
5.7, we shipped 27 advisories to address 109 vulnerabilities. 3
advisories were rated critical, 12 were important, and the remaining
12 were moderate and low.
Or, for all packages, from release of 5.6 to and including 5.7, we
shipped 58 advisories to address 172 vulnerabilities. 4 advisories
were rated critical, 20 were important, and the remaining 34 were
moderate and low.
Critical vulnerabilities
The 4 critical advisories addressed 34 critical vulnerabilities across just 2 different packages:
- An update to OpenJDK 6 Java Runtime Environment,
(June 2011)
where a web site hosting a malicious Java applet could potentially run
arbitrary code as the user.
- Three updates to Firefox (March 2011, April 2011, June 2011)
where a malicious web site could potentially run arbitrary code as the user
running Firefox.
Updates to correct all of the 34 critical vulnerabilities were
available via Red Hat Network either the same day or the next
calendar day after the issues were public.
Overall, for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 since release until 5.7, 97%
of critical vulnerabilities have had an update available to address
them available from the Red Hat Network either the same day or the
next calendar day after the issue was public.
Other significant vulnerabilities
Although not in the definition of critical severity, also of interest during
this period were a couple of flaws that were easily exploitable:
- A flaw in dhcp,
CVE-2011-0997,
fixed by
RHSA-2011:0428, where a malicious DHCP
server could send a response that could lead to arbitrary code execution on connecting clients.
- A flaw in glibc,
CVE-2011-0536,
fixed by
RHSA-2011:0412,
where a local user could gain root privileges.
In addition, updates to Firefox
and NSS were
made to blacklist a number of
compromised
SSL certificates.
Previous update releases
To compare these statistics with previous update releases we need
to take into account that the time between each update release is different.
So looking at a default installation and calculating the number of
advisories per month gives the following chart:

This data is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running Enterprise
Linux 5 Server, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other major
versions, distributions, or operating systems -- for example, a default install
of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4AS did not include Firefox, but 5 Server does. You
can use our public
security measurement data and tools, and run your own custom metrics for any
given Red Hat product, package set, timescales, and severity range of interest.
See also:
5.5 to 5.6,
5.4 to 5.5,
5.3 to 5.4,
5.2 to 5.3,
5.1 to 5.2, and
5.0 to 5.1
risk reports.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.1 was released this week (May 2011), just
over six months since the release of 6.0 in October 2010. So let's
use this opportunity to take a quick look back over the
vulnerabilities and security updates made in that time, specifically
for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Server.
Errata count
The chart below illustrates the total number of security updates issued for Red
Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Server if you had installed 6.0, up to and including the
6.1 release, broken down by severity. It's split into two columns, one for
the packages you'd get if you did a default install, and the other if you
installed every single package (which is unlikely as it would involve a bit of
manual effort to select every one). For a given installation, the number of
package updates and vulnerabilities that affected you will depend on exactly what you
have installed or removed.
So, for a default install, from release of 6.0 up to and including 6.1, we
shipped 54 advisories to address 195 vulnerabilities. 2 advisories were rated
critical, 29 were important, and the remaining 23 were moderate and low.
Or, for all packages, from release of 6.0 up to and including 6.1, we shipped
102 advisories to address 345 vulnerabilities. 8 advisories were rated critical,
39 were important, and the remaining 55 were moderate and low.
These figures include 10 advisories we released on the day we shipped
6.0. This was because we froze package updates some months before
releasing the product. Two of those updates were rated critical,
an update to Firefox, and to Samba.
Critical vulnerabilities
The 8 critical advisories addressed 37 critical vulnerabilities across 4 components:
- An update to Samba (October 2010)
where a malicious client could potentially run arbitrary code as the Samba
server. Samba is a default install package but the server is not enabled by default.
- Four updates to Firefox (October 2010, December 2010, March 2011, April 2011)
where a malicious web site could potentially run arbitrary code as the user
running Firefox.
- Two updates to Thunderbird (March 2011, April 2011)
where a malicious email message could potentially run arbitrary code as the user
running Thunderbird.
- An update to Pango (March 2011)
where an application using Pango to parse untrusted font data (such as
Firefox) could potentially run
arbitrary code as the privileges of the user. Pango is a default install package.
Updates to correct all of the 37 critical vulnerabilities were
available via Red Hat Network either the same day or the next calendar
day after the issues were public.
This data is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running Enterprise
Linux 6 Server, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other major
versions, distributions, or operating systems -- for example, a default install
of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4AS and 6 Server did not include Firefox, but 5
Server does. You can use
our public security
measurement data and tools, and run your own custom metrics for any given
Red Hat product, package set, timescales, and severity range of interest.
Earlier this year, Red Hat joined the Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework
(CVRF) working group run by ICASI. The goal of CVRF is to provide a way to
share information about security updates in a machine-readable format. Red Hat
already produce a version of our security advisories in machine readable format,
as OVAL definitions, but these are really designed for automated test tools to
determine the need to apply an update. CVRF looked like it would be more useful
for providing customers with a machine readable view of our advisories.
After many iterations at getting right schema, CVRF 1.0 was released this week.
Red Hat is not yet providing an official archive with CVRF representations of
our advisories, but we have created tools internally to support it and allow us
to automatically create CVRF documents based on our advisory database. We've
provided a sample set of advisories
in CVRF format for download.
Let's take one of these samples, a recent Red Hat Enterprise Linux security
advisory and examine how it looks when automatically converted to a CVRF document.
Our advisories often fix more than one vulnerability at a time and for more than
one version of a product, but for this example we'll keep it
simple. RHSA-2010:0888
is an Enterprise Linux 6 update to fix the vulnerability CVE-2010-3864 affecting
OpenSSL.
The CVRF for this advisory starts like this:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.0"
xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.0"
xmlns:cvrf-vuln="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.0">
<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">Red Hat Security Advisory: openssl security update</DocumentTitle>
<DocumentDistribution xml:lang="en">Copyright © 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.</DocumentDistribution>
<LegalDisclaimer xml:lang="en">Please see http://www.redhat.com/legal/legal_statement.html</LegalDisclaimer>
<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
<DocumentPublisher>Vendor</DocumentPublisher>
The first section, above, is pretty straightforward: we're publishing this CVRF
as the authoritative vendor for Red Hat Enterprise Linux, and it's a Security
Advisory. All our text fields have a language identifier ("en") as future
CVRF advisories could contain localized parts.
<DocumentTracking>
<DocumentID>RHSA-2010:0888</DocumentID>
<DocumentStatus>Final</DocumentStatus>
<DocumentVersion>1</DocumentVersion>
<DocumentRevisionHistory>
<DocumentRevision>
<RevisionNumber>1.0</RevisionNumber>
<RevisionDate>2010-11-16T16:08:00+00:00</RevisionDate>
<RevisionDescription>Current version</RevisionDescription>
</DocumentRevision>
</DocumentRevisionHistory>
<DocumentInitialReleaseDate>2010-11-16T16:08:00+00:00</DocumentInitialReleaseDate>
<DocumentCurrentReleaseDate>2010-11-16T16:08:00+00:00</DocumentCurrentReleaseDate>
The next section is about document revision history and is a mandatory
requirement of CVRF documents. This is tricky for Red Hat to automatically
generate from our existing advisories: we use an internal "Push Count" as our
revision number, and occasional problems during pushing an advisory live mean
that our first real public version is not "1". In addition, when we do release an
update to an advisory, we update the description text with details of the
changes made, so we don't have this text stored in a separate field. So for now
our CVRF "RevisionDescription" sections will not have useful descriptions,
but the initial and current release dates will be accurate.
<DocumentGenerator>
<Generator>make-cvrf-from-et.pl</Generator>
<GenerationDate>2010-12-15T10:15:06+00:00</GenerationDate>
<CVRFVersion>1.00</CVRFVersion>
</DocumentGenerator>
</DocumentTracking>
During the design of CVRF we championed this separate
"DocumentGenerator" section, which mirrors a similar section in OVAL. This can
help us track down any errors in published documents and allows us to regenerate
a document if our automated script is altered or fixed without causing a new
document revision.
<DocumentSummary>
<Summary Title="Topic" Audience="General" xml:lang="en">
Updated openssl packages that fix one security issue are now available for
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.
The Red Hat Security Response Team has rated this update as having
important security impact. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available from the
CVE link in the References section.
</Summary>
</DocumentSummary>
<DocumentDetails>
<Details Title="Details" Audience="General" xml:lang="en">
OpenSSL is a toolkit that implements the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols, as well as a
full-strength, general purpose cryptography library.
A race condition flaw has been found in the OpenSSL TLS server extension
parsing code, which could affect some multithreaded OpenSSL applications.
Under certain specific conditions, it may be possible for a remote attacker
to trigger this race condition and cause such an application to crash, or
possibly execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the application.
(CVE-2010-3864)
Note that this issue does not affect the Apache HTTP Server. Refer to Red
Hat Bugzilla bug 649304 for more technical details on how to determine if
your application is affected.
Red Hat would like to thank Rob Hulswit for reporting this issue.
All OpenSSL users should upgrade to these updated packages, which contain a
backported patch to resolve this issue. For the update to take effect, all
services linked to the OpenSSL library must be restarted, or the system
rebooted.
</Details>
</DocumentDetails>
The document summary and details sections above are directly copied from the
equivalent sections in our text advisory. This does mean however that the
details of the vulnerabilities will get repeated, as later each vulnerability
gets its own section with description, CVE name, and acknowledgments.
<References>
<RelatedDocument>
<DocumentURL>https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0888.html</DocumentURL>
<DocumentDescription>https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2010-0888.html</DocumentDescription>
</RelatedDocument>
<RelatedDocument>
<DocumentURL>http://www.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#important</DocumentURL>
<DocumentDescription>http://www.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#important</DocumentDescription>
</RelatedDocument>
</References>
References can appear both at the top level of a CVRF document as well as for each
vulnerability. The most important top level reference is the self-reference
which links to the full representation of the advisory. In early CVRF drafts
this had a separate attribute so that it was possible to extract the self
reference URL; we think that would have been useful to still be there.
<AggregateSeverity>Important</AggregateSeverity>
<IssuingAuthority VendorID="Red Hat, Inc">secalert@redhat.com</IssuingAuthority>
The final top level directives give our severity rating and issuing authority.
The severity is a free-text field and it's up to each vendor to use their own
scheme for this. In the earlier references section we already gave a URL that
described the severity levels being used; for a future CVRF version we
should have that URL referenced as part of the AggregateSeverity tag.
<cvrf-vuln:Vulnerability>
<cvrf-vuln:VulnerabilityID><cvrf-vuln:Value SystemName="CVE">CVE-2010-3864</cvrf-vuln:Value></cvrf-vuln:VulnerabilityID>
<cvrf-vuln:VulnerabilityDetails xml:lang="en">A race condition flaw
has been found in the OpenSSL TLS server extension parsing code, which could
affect some multithreaded OpenSSL applications. Under certain specific
conditions, it may be possible for a remote attacker to trigger this race
condition and cause such an application to crash, or possibly execute
arbitrary code with the permissions of the
application. </cvrf-vuln:VulnerabilityDetails>
We produce one vulnerability section for each CVE fixed, and the vulnerability
details are abstracted from our full text description.
<cvrf-vuln:VendorRemediationStatus>Completed</cvrf-vuln:VendorRemediationStatus>
<cvrf-vuln:CVE>CVE-2010-3864</cvrf-vuln:CVE>
<cvrf-vuln:Threat><cvrf-vuln:Impact>Important</cvrf-vuln:Impact></cvrf-vuln:Threat>
<cvrf-vuln:ProductFamily>Red Hat Enterprise Linux</cvrf-vuln:ProductFamily>
<cvrf-vuln:Acknowledgment>Red Hat would like to thank Rob Hulswit for reporting this issue.</cvrf-vuln:Acknowledgment>
<cvrf-vuln:CVSS>
<cvrf-vuln:CVSSBaseScore>7.6</cvrf-vuln:CVSSBaseScore>
<cvrf-vuln:CVSSScoringVector>AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C</cvrf-vuln:CVSSScoringVector>
</cvrf-vuln:CVSS>
VendorRemediationStatus will always be "Completed" for all our advisories as they are
always released at the same time as a fix. Also included is a per-vulnerability
impact rating and CVSS base score. These are currently not included in our
HTML advisories, but are available from our CVE database and Bugzilla entries;
so it's handy to be able to have them all in the same document for the first time.
<cvrf-vuln:Remediation>
<cvrf-vuln:VendorFix xml:lang="en">
Before applying this update, make sure all previously-released errata
relevant to your system have been applied.
This update is available via the Red Hat Network. Details on how to
use the Red Hat Network to apply this update are available at
http://kbase.redhat.com/faq/docs/DOC-11259
</cvrf-vuln:VendorFix>
</cvrf-vuln:Remediation>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedPlatform Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux">
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop Optional (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-devel-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-perl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-static-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node Optional (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-devel-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-perl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-static-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation Optional (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-perl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-static-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-devel-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server Optional (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-perl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-static-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
<cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease Name="Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server (v. 6)">
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-debuginfo-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
<cvrf-vuln:Version Type="Fixed">openssl-devel-1.0.0-4.el6_0.1</cvrf-vuln:Version>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedRelease>
</cvrf-vuln:AffectedPlatform>
The remediation section mirrors our advisories by giving a list of packages and
the versions that first contained the fix for the issue. We have multiple
variants of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, and some vulnerabilities will affect
packages only shipped in some subset of variants, so the duplication is required.
<cvrf-vuln:References>
<cvrf-vuln:RelatedDocument>
<cvrf-vuln:DocumentURL>https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2010-3864.html</cvrf-vuln:DocumentURL>
<cvrf-vuln:DocumentDescription>CVE-2010-3864</cvrf-vuln:DocumentDescription>
</cvrf-vuln:RelatedDocument>
<cvrf-vuln:RelatedDocument>
<cvrf-vuln:DocumentURL>https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=649304</cvrf-vuln:DocumentURL>
<cvrf-vuln:DocumentDescription>bz#649304: CVE-2010-3864 OpenSSL TLS extension parsing race condition</cvrf-vuln:DocumentDescription>
</cvrf-vuln:RelatedDocument>
</cvrf-vuln:References>
</cvrf-vuln:Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>
Finally, the per-vulnerability reference section links to our CVE database for
each CVE, and the Red Hat bug database for more technical details of the vulnerability and
how it was addressed.
Our example advisory only had one vulnerability, but the whole vulnerability
section is repeated where multiple are addressed.
Overall we've been really pleased with the way CVRF has turned out for it's
first release, and we think it will be a useful way for vendors such as us to
provide machine-readable advisories to customers as well as to tool vendors,
filling a gap between our OVAL XML and our text and HTML advisories. We'll
be trialling CVRF advisories later this year, drop an email to
secalert@redhat.com if you have
comments on our CVRF samples.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.6 was released last week (January 2011), nearly ten
months since the release of 5.5 in March 2010. So let's use this opportunity to
take a quick look back over the vulnerabilities and security updates made in
that time, specifically for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Server.
Errata count
The chart below illustrates the total number of security updates issued for Red
Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Server if you had installed 5.5, up to and including the
5.6 release, broken down by severity. It's split into two columns, one for
the packages you'd get if you did a default install, and the other if you
installed every single package (which is unlikely as it would involve a bit of
manual effort to select every one). For a given installation, the number of
package updates and vulnerabilities that affected you will depend on exactly what you
have installed or removed.

So, for a default install, from release of 5.5 up to and including
5.6, we shipped 57 advisories to address 206 vulnerabilities. 10
advisories were rated critical, 27 were important, and the remaining
20 were moderate and low.
Or, for all packages, from release of 5.5 to and including 5.6, we
shipped 80 advisories to address 300 vulnerabilities. 12 advisories
were rated critical, 34 were important, and the remaining 34 were
moderate and low.
Critical vulnerabilities
The 12 critical advisories addressed 49 critical vulnerabilities across just 3 different packages:
- An update to the Exim Internet Mailer,
(December 2010),
where an unauthenticated remote attacker could run arbitrary code as root on a
server.
Exim is not a default package or enabled by default. There is a
public exploit for this issue which worked on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.
- Two updates over three advisories to Samba,
(June 2010 for
Samba 3.0 and Samba 3.3,
September 2010 for
Samba 3.0 and
Samba 3.3),
where a malicious client could send a specially-crafted SMB packet to the Samba
server, potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the Samba
server. I'm not aware of any working public exploits for these issues.
- Eight updates to Firefox (March 2010, June 2010, 20 July 2010, 23 July 2010, September 2010, 19 October 2010, 27 October 2010, December 2010)
where a malicious web site could potentially run arbitrary code as the user
running Firefox.
Updates to correct 48 out of the 49 critical vulnerabilities were
available via Red Hat Network either the same day or the next
calendar day after the issues were public. The update to fix Exim took
3 calendar days from
the date of the report
to the Exim developers.
Overall, for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 since release until 5.6, 97%
of critical vulnerabilities have had an update available to address
them available from the Red Hat Network either the same day or the
next calendar day after the issue was public.
Other significant vulnerabilities
Although not in the definition of critical severity, also of interest during
this period were several kernel flaws that where an local user could gain
root privileges. The following had publicly available exploits:
- A fix
for CVE-2010-2240
was provided
by RHSA-2010-0661
(August 2010). The public exploit did not work against Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5, but it may be possible to create one that does.
- A fix
for CVE-2010-3081
was provided
by RHSA-2010-0704
(September 2010). The public exploit worked against Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5
- A fix
for CVE-2010-3904
was provided
by RHSA-2010-0792
(October 2010). The public exploit did not work against Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5 but it is possible to create one that does.
Previous updates
To compare these statistics with previous update releases we need
to take into account that the time between each update is different.
So looking at a default installation and calculating the number of
advisories per month gives the following chart:

This data is interesting to get a feel for the risk of running Enterprise
Linux 5 Server, but isn't really useful for comparisons with other major
versions, distributions, or operating systems -- for example, a default install
of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4AS did not include Firefox, but 5 Server does. You
can use our public
security measurement data and tools, and run your own custom metrics for any
given Red Hat product, package set, timescales, and severity range of interest.
See also:
5.4 to 5.5,
5.3 to 5.4,
5.2 to 5.3,
5.1 to 5.2, and
5.0 to 5.1
risk reports.
Two years ago I published a table
of Vulnerability and
threat mitigation features in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and Fedora. Now that
we've released Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, it's time to update the table. Thanks
to Eugene Teo for collating this information.
Between releases there are lots of changes made to improve security and we've not
listed everything; just a high-level overview of the things we think are most
interesting that help mitigate security risk. We could go into much more
detail, breaking out the number of daemons covered by the SELinux default
policy, the number of binaries compiled PIE, and so on.
Note that this table is for the most common architectures, x86 and x86_64 only; other supported architectures may vary.
Starting with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 we have switched to using
SHA-256 signatures on all RPM packages and to a 4096-bit RSA signing
key.
We've done this because it is current best practice to migrate away from MD5
and SHA-1 hashes due to various flaws found in them. Those flaws don't yet
directly pose a threat to package signing however, and therefore our existing
shipped products which used these older hashes will continue to use their
existing keys until they reach their end of life.
A similar switch to stronger signing was
already made
in Fedora 11. This switch involved some changes to the RPM application.
So what this means is that we used new signing keys for both the beta and
final release packages for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6. Those keys were created
and are protected by a hardware security
module, as we've done
with previous keys.
Details
and fingerprint of the new key, #fd431d51.
Also in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 distribution we've started
to simplify the layout of the key files in
the /etc/pki/rpm-gpg/
directory:
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-beta : Both the old and new beta keys
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release : Both the new signing key and the auxiliary key
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-legacy-release : The signing key used for EL5
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-legacy-former : The signing key used for products before EL5
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-legacy-rhx : The signing key used for RHX
The auxiliary key mentioned above is for emergency use. We created it some
time ago on a new standalone machine, took a hardcopy printout of the private
key and passphrase, stored them separately and securely, and destroyed the
software copies. We've planned for many eventualities, but in the unlikely
event we lose the ability to sign with the hardware key we could retrieve the
printout, type in the key, and continue to sign updates.
|
|
|
Hi! I'm Mark Cox. This blog gives my
thoughts and opinions on my security
work, open source, fedora, home automation,
and other topics.
pics from my twitter:
popular tags:
[all],
apache,
apachecon,
apacheweek,
cve,
cvss,
fedora,
financial,
geocaching,
ha,
metrics,
microsoft,
nashville,
north carolina,
red hat summit,
redhat,
security,
trips

|
|