mark :: blog
Starting with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 we have switched to using
SHA-256 signatures on all RPM packages and to a 4096-bit RSA signing
We've done this because it is current best practice to migrate away from MD5
and SHA-1 hashes due to various flaws found in them. Those flaws don't yet
directly pose a threat to package signing however, and therefore our existing
shipped products which used these older hashes will continue to use their
existing keys until they reach their end of life.
A similar switch to stronger signing was
in Fedora 11. This switch involved some changes to the RPM application.
So what this means is that we used new signing keys for both the beta and
final release packages for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6. Those keys were created
and are protected by a hardware security
module, as we've done
with previous keys.
and fingerprint of the new key, #fd431d51.
Also in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 distribution we've started
to simplify the layout of the key files in
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-beta : Both the old and new beta keys
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release : Both the new signing key and the auxiliary key
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-legacy-release : The signing key used for EL5
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-legacy-former : The signing key used for products before EL5
- RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-legacy-rhx : The signing key used for RHX
The auxiliary key mentioned above is for emergency use. We created it some
time ago on a new standalone machine, took a hardcopy printout of the private
key and passphrase, stored them separately and securely, and destroyed the
software copies. We've planned for many eventualities, but in the unlikely
event we lose the ability to sign with the hardware key we could retrieve the
printout, type in the key, and continue to sign updates.
Created: 11 Nov 2010
Tagged as: fedora, metrics, redhat, security
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Hi! I'm Mark Cox. This blog gives my
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